In this paper, we formulated heterogeneous coexistence strategy in TVWS (TV White Space) between Primary Users (PUs), Cognitive Secondary Networks (CSNs) and TVWS coexistence standards using Cournot economic game model. Cournot economic game model is based on quantity and it is appropriate because, there are fewer TV transmitters in rural areas and hence, lots of TVWS spectrum channels per footprint. The robustness of the proposed model is that, it takes into account the unique SINR requirements of both PU and CSNs. While simultaneously, maintaining the key functionalities of heterogeneous coexistence framework. Contrary to the norm that, as PU continues to sell their licensed spectrum, revenue is maximized. Rather, it was discovered by way of simulations, such assumption never hold. However, Cournot point is simulated in which PU can maximize both revenue and QoS. In spectrum auction, an arbitrator is required to act as a spectrum broker, we propose the use of existing TVWS standards for this purpose. Thus, enabling coexistence between PUs and TVWS networks.
INTRODUCTION
The task force constituted by US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to study spectrum utilization reported that most of the currently licensed VHF and UHF spectrum bands are highly underutilized [1] . Hence, there is a need for a paradigm shift from the conventional fixed spectrum assignment to a market driven spectrum policies capable of sustaining the large demand for broadband services. The unused spectrum holes are referred as White Spaces and when such occurs in TV channels, it is referred as TVWS. The Recent advances in Reconfigurable Radio Technology (RRT) can be exploited as a possible solution to the abovementioned problem. A special class of RRT being proposed as an attractive candidate is Cognitive radio (CR) [2] . CR is defined as a smart radio with the ability to learn, observe, optimize, and change their transmission parameters according to the ambient radio environment [3] . Consequently, CR is set to revolutionize spectrum resource utilization in wireless communication through Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) technology. As a result, communication regulations worldwide have capitalized on DSA by relaxing spectrum rules to enable secondary users to gain temporary access to licensed spectrum in the absence of PUs. Beginning with TV channels in the VHF-UHF bands (54-806 MHz) [4] . Hence the names, TV White Space Band devices (TVBD) connote nodes that operate in PU free TV spectrum. Expectedly, many wireless standards are envisioned to be deployed in the TVWS. The standards targeting TVWS include IEEE 802.22 for Wireless Regional Area Networks (WRANs) [4] , IEEE 802.11af "Super Wi-Fi" [5] . With the plethora of networks jostling for spectrum access in the TVWS, heterogeneous coexistence between different operators, standards and technologies are expected to mar the QoS of the end-users if not well coordinated. Thus, aggravating the already complex Radio Resource Management (RRM). Heterogeneity and coexistence are not novel to wireless standards as both have been successfully implemented in the ISM bands. However, it is expected to be an important topic in TVWS because of the variability of TVWS channels which is spatial-temporary. Different initiatives have also been proposed by IEEE 802.19 and IEEE P1900.4 as to improve coexistence in the TVWS [6, 7] . The aforementioned TVWS standards have propose coexistence etiquette for harmonious coexistence in TVWS, which can only be implemented based on the conformance on the availability of TVWS spectrum. Thus, the underlay research issue in TVWS is how best spectrum channels can be made readily available to TVWS networks. Not just TVWS channels but also, high quality spectrum channels in the context of reduced switching cost.
The present TVWS architecture focuses more on autonomous architecture in which there is little or no contact between the PUs and TVWS networks. This approach is detrimental to the operational efficiency of TVWS networks because lots of wireless resources in-terms of power and bandwidth are utilized to ascertain the absence of PU signals. Thus, depriving TVWS valuable income as well as, lowering QoS. Furthermore, It has been reported that most mobile operators consider CR to be disruptive to their QoS and are not keen in spectrum sharing [8] . An approach that is currently unexploited in TVWS is economic model. Economic model present an alternative strategy on heterogeneous coexistence in TVWS. And, it is based on Exclusive spectrum model which empowers spectrum owners with the right to temporary lease their spectrum without the intervention of the regulatory bodies [1] . In order to improve the quality of the offered spectrum to TVWS networks, game theory becomes handy. Game theory as implemented herein, provides a strategy in which the PU receives a higher virtual revenue by offering a more stable spectrum to TVWS networks. On the other hand, TVWS is assured of higher spectrum quality. The main contributions of this paper are; (i) Using the principles of Cournot economic game to derive the optimal offered spectrum (ii) Based on Cournot economic game model, framework for a heterogeneous coexistence in TVWS involving all the composite standards was presented. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. TVWS Shannon capacity system model and problem formulation are described in II. Game theory and related works including Cournot economic model in III.TVWS standards highlights in IV, coexistence mechanism and proposed strategy discussed in V. Simulation results are presented in VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in VII. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL

A. Problem Formulation
The PUN channels of the same base station of are presume to be perfectly orthogonal to each other. Thus, there are minimal cochannel and adjacent channel interference. PUNs want to sell portions of the (e.g. time slots in a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) or Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) at a price P per unit channel to TVWS users). The spectrum demand function of TVWS networks depends on price charged by the PUNs. Finding the optimal offered spectrum by the PUs without much loss in SNR and maximum revenue can be solved by game theory.
B. TVWS Network Capacity Model
The 
where A denotes a TV transmitter coverage region, denotes different TVWS operators in a given geographical location A, Τ, Λ denotes the probability P of a channel being available in a TVWS cell T with parameter Λ, captures spectrum bonding based on the fact that TVWS allows spectrum bonding of continuous and non-continuous (interleaved) TV channels with maximum number of 3TV channels [4] , is the interference from primary user to secondary user while , is the interference from secondary user to secondary user. Independently of the employed multiple access scheme, the foremost goal in a communications system is the spectrum availability. Therefore, in this paper, we are restricted to the parameter B.
Having secured the required bandwidth, adaptive coding and modulation is performed dynamically to adjust the transmission rate based on the estimated channel quality gain. The payload modulation supported by IEEE 802.22 is BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM and 802.11af PSK, 16-QAM and 64-QAM [5] . The spectral efficiency of TVWS networks is stated as;
( )
γ is the SNR at the receiver and BER is the target bit-errorrate.
III. GAME THEORY
As have already been mentioned in the preceding section, TVWS is envisioned to be co-inhabited by various TVWS networks each serving different segment of wireless communication entity. Selfish heterogeneous networks will populate TVWS each trying to maximize access in a dynamic evolving spectrum regime. As a result, there is a need for the composite networks to be aware of the set of strategies at the disposal of other networks and subsequently adjust their parameters accordingly. The ability to comprehend and react appropriately to each other's' set of strategy profiles is known as game theory. Therefore, game theory is expected to play a predominant role in studying, modeling, analyzing TVWS spectrum management [9] . By using game theory, a selfenforcing equilibrium is attained in which there are no incentives for any TVWS network to act otherwise. The relevance of game theory in TVWS cannot be over emphasized based on the fact TVWS consists of Primary Users (PU) in one hand and TVWS networks on the other hand. Furthermore, there is an inherent tendency for networks to behave selfishly and hence, limit the overall system efficiency and network capacity as indicated in (3) . Consequently, by studying game theory as it relates to TVWS, an efficient and robust network is obtained in which, there is harmonious coexistence. In the recent times, game theory model has featured predominantly. Spectrum auction comprising of pricing, allocation and billing system for cognitive radio has been suggested and implemented through a multi-unit sealed bid auction [10] . However, none has been implemented in the area of TVWS, which is a practical implementation of the abstraction of cognitive radio.
A. Economic System Model And Assumptions
The paradigm shift from the previous command and control spectrum approach to the proposed spectrum commons model cannot be considered optimal because of lack in-built regulatory control [11] . Based on shortcomings of the proposed spectrum commons, a new approach known as an economic model has been proffered and is on the horizon as an alternative approach [12] . The economic spectrum model has resulted in spectrum pricing problem in cognitive radio technology, whereby multiple licensed spectrum owners compete with each other to provide spectrum access opportunity to secondary users for a fee and how much the respective operators need to pay in order to reach an optimal Nash Equilibrium [13] . In literature, two widely used approaches to economic model in spectrum sharing are auctioning and Bertrand model [13] . The approaches emphasize more on profit through price without recourse on spectrum quality. The abovementioned approaches are detrimental to the TWVS operators who need a base assurance on spectrum quality to ensure some minimum QoS to their clients.
B. Cournot-Game
Various approaches have been proposed to model economic spectrum sharing [12, 13] . Our paper ties together the two known approaches in literature co-operative and non-cooperative bargaining strategy. We model the association between the primary users and the various TVWS standards in a given area as Cournot-Nash model. Cournot duopoly is an economic model in which firms choose their quantities; independently and simultaneously. Profit maximization depends on the quantity. In terms of spectrum model, it is a hybrid between spectrum commons and exclusive model. We are interested in the game based on QoS of both the primary users and the secondary users.
The Formation of Cornout Game
The formulation of Cornout game for PUs are given as; Let G = , , , . 
is the spectrum substitutability factor given as . By choosing this form, it is assumed that players receive a diminishing marginal price with increasing bandwidth; (a standard assumption in network theory). It is assumed that the strategy space of each PUN is a compact, convex set with a minimum and maximum spectrum quantity constraint denoted by and , respectively for Cournot Economic Spectrum Game (CESG). For CESG, we set = 0 , which results in strategy space 0, . In this formulating this game, certain assumptions were made; i) the other players spectrum quantity will be made transparent by the spectrum moderator and ii) virtual price is fixed and known. is bandwidth offered to be shared by PUNs to TVWS networks. The use of squared function is as a result of considering as noise and variance in signal processing. The above is a marginal cost function because, the degradation that PUNs receives are directly proportional to the number of TVWS base stations sharing that frequency transmitting.
Cost Function Modelling
PUN Revenue Modeling
For the problem formulation, we derive the utility function as a quadratic function, which is the standard practice in utility maximization. The motivation for using the quadratic function is given as: (i) Utility function is concave, and therefore, it is able to represent the saturation of user satisfaction as more spectrum is offered for transmission. Concave utility functions are widely used to quantify the satisfaction, and (ii) Differentiating the resultant quadratic utility function results in a linear bandwidth utility function, which makes the subsequent analysis tractable. The utility i obtained by selling can be expressed formally as:
( ) 
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium (NE) are points in which the players have no advantage by deviating by playing different set of strategies
At NE, given the spectrum quantity choice of other PUNs, no PUNs can improve its utility level by making individual changes it its offered spectrum quantity. The spectrum level chosen by a rational self-optimizing user constitutes a Best Response (BR) to the spectrum quantity chosen by other PUNs. Having formally defined the terms, its natural to proceed and establish the utility of the dominant PUN i and others -i by expanding (5), (6) and (7), as; Finding the NE, which is to identify the BR of each of the firm quantity as a function of the other firm and find where they intercept. We twice differentiate and set equal to zero. That is where each of the PUN maximizes its utility with respect to another. Finding the First Order Condition (FOC) of (9) At the each of the PUN will maximize their revenue based on cost, which is equated in spectrum degradation is marginal, meaning that at any offered spectrum to be shared, the unit cost increases.
IV. IEEE TVWS STANDARDS
The standardization activities in TVWS began in 2004. They were formulated to provide PHY/MAC layer solutions to enhance the deployability and enhance operational efficiency of TVWS networks. The standards were saddled to design environment specific architecture meeting end-users QoS expectation. The various standards have evolved each modifying the PHY and MAC (bandwidth, transmission power, system architecture, deployment scenarios) layer protocols to suit their targeted clients. The focus of this section is to highlight the various TVWS standards expected to populate the TVWS spectrum.
A. IEEE-802.22 Wireless Rural Area Network (WRAN)
The IEEE 802.22 standard was specifically established to provide wireless broadband access to rural and hard to reach areas, hence the acronym Wireless Rural Area Network (WRAN) [4] . IEEE 802.22 Working Group (WG) mandate was to develop physical (PHY) and medium access (MAC) layer specifications based on point-to-multipoint (PMP) WRAN topology. IEEE 802.22 is aptly designed for the rural areas based on the premise that there are lots of TVWS in the rural areas and also, the sparse location of consumers in the rural areas makes no economic sense to deploy other legacy standard. Fig.1 WRAN 802.22 deployment scenario 
B. IEEE-802.11 af Wireless Rural Area Network (WRAN)
The IEEE 802.11 af is a modified version of IEEE 802.11 but the main difference is that it operates in TVWS frequency band. Consequently, has an inherent characteristic of longer range and is equipped with CR properties. Hence the name "Super Wi-Fi". The 802.11af can compete with Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) IEEE 802.16 standard in-terms of range. The cognitive functions are enabled by Channel Power Management (CPM) as well as Dynamic Station Enablement (DSE), which controls the channel depend on stations (STA) under its portfolio [4] . To encourage harmonious co-existence in TVWS, IEEE has set up Task Group (TG) to proffer solutions in-terms of frame work. The two IEEE TGs are IEEE 802.19 [5] and IEEE P1900.4 Baseline Standards [6] .
C. IEEE 802.19
IEEE 802.19 has suggested some key entities to enhance the coexistence in TVWS [6] . The key elements are
• Coexistence Algorithms -The functionality of the algorithm is to analyze statistics collected from different TVBD and check if there is a need to for coexistence. In such situation, the algorithm will be executed to help in decision making for all the TVBD to coexist. The standard supports three decision making genealogy centralized, distributed and autonomous decision making for TVWS coexistence.
• Multimode communication-P802.19.1 shall be equipped with a multimode radio so as communicate with all the P802.19.1 compliant TVBD.
• Software Define Radio (SDR) capabilities -P802.19.1 shall have SDR reconfiguration capabilities so as to adjust key parameters such as; center frequency and transmits power. D. IEEE P1900. 4 Baseline Standard CRN requires intelligence in Radio Resource Management (RRM) because of the variability in spectrum channels and need to obtain a priori knowledge of operating environment. This led to the formation of IEEE 1900.4 standard in February 2007 [6] . To implement intelligent RRM, IEEE 1900.4 defined three architectures namely; system, functional and information model architectures to support three use cases. The three use cases defined by IEEE 1900.4 are dynamic spectrum assignment, dynamic spectrum sharing, and distributed radio resource usage optimization in order to realize its objective. In this section, we are proposing the use of Cournot game model to enhance the coexistence in TVWS as shown in Table 1 , factoring in the competition among the PUs and dynamic spectrum sharing problem in cognitive radio networks. Step 1; Spectrum Collector IEEE P1900.4 IEEE P1900.4 receives the offered spectrum (Cournot qty) from PUNs and stores the spectrum variability index and quantity.
Step 2; Spectrum Middleman IEEE 802.19 IEEE 802.19 announces the spectrum supply and price to TVWS operators and collects their demands.
Step 3; IEEE 802.22 and IEEE 802.11 af Sends in their spectrum demand and pay for their services through their budget.
Step 4; IEEE 802.22 and IEEE 802.11 af Reports their utility level to IEEE 802.19 and the need higher spectrum quality, they increase their price.
Step 5
The updates in price and spectrum quality is incremental and stopped when TVWS utility is satisfied.
Based on our framework shown in Fig.4 , we analyze and delineate roles to the emerging TVWS standards to avoid the degradation of the CRN thereby enhancing the co-existence of heterogeneous networks in TVWS. − . c1 = c2 = 1 dB. For the dynamic price adaptation algorithms, the initial prices are set as follows: υ1=3, υ2= 1.
B. Numerical analysis I. Effects of PU Offered Spectrum and PU Nodes'SINR
Cournot game is studied herein to determine the optimal spectrum quantity that PUs have to share with TVWS networks without TV receivers suffering a deep null in QoS. As can be seen from (6), the SINR degrades as more spectrum is offered to TVWS networks and hence, PUs link capacity. Although, both networks are not operating on the same frequency, however, the presence of TVWS networks causes adjacent channel interference to TV receivers. The recently introduced term Interference temperature by FCC is a practical indicator of the threshold PUs can reliably sell. From Fig.5 , as the SNR is lowered from 12 dB to 10 dB, the SINR of the receivers decreases tremendously. Furthermore, as the PUs continue to offer a spectrum, a point will be reached when their signals will be considered as noise by their receivers. Conversely, The PUs receivers can still utilize this degraded signal if their filter receiver's operating characteristics (ROC) are properly tuned and are robust enough to operate in noise environment. 
III. Price and Profit Under Different Spectrum Quantity
The best response functions for both the primary users are shown in Fig 6. Under different channel quantity PU1, PU2 and cost function. As has been stated in Eq.7 and Eq.8. The Best Response (BR)for the primary users occurs at each of the primary users offering half of the available spectrum for heterogeneous coexistence. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is located at point where the best response functions of the primary user intersect. Above, the NE point, the PU will be making loss. Evidently, the slope of the spectrum both by both PUs exhibits a downward trend. This means that as both PUs offer more bandwidth for sale, their unit revenue decreases. This is in conformance of Fig. 5 . Thus, resulting to PUs to offer just the Cournot spectrum quantity which ensures high QoS for both PUs and TVWS networks. Hence, coexistence in TVWS. The same characterization is exhibited for different cost function.
VII CONCLUSION
Heterogeneous coexistence in TVWS studied herein showed that it can be obtained via non mix strategy. Pure strategy as has been advocated by IEEE TG via framework will lead to sub-optimal solutions because PU might not want to share their spectrum with CRNs. By incorporating economic model, PUN will be interested in sharing their spectrum channels with CRNs. We use Cournot game model to analyze this duopoly market situation and the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution to this game via enforcement incentive introduced by IEEE P 1900.4. The mix-strategy as implemented here in Cournot game model ensures that the noncooperative game is forced to be cooperative via our coexistence model. As a result of this, the SINR requirements of both the PUN subscribers and TVWS users are protected.
